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L Intndudion

The last fifteen years have seen a renev.'al of interest from eoonomists in spatial issues. What sbrted as
an attempt to re-invigorate regio.nal economics by Paul Krugman and his associates has led to a flurry
of theoretical work, which cuhninated with the publication of Fujita, Krugman and Venables' Spatial

Economy ( 1999). In tum, these theoretical developments - the ' New Economic Geography' - ha:\1-e
triggered a wave of empirical reseaR:h and also inspired mme policy-oriented work (e.g., Baldwin,

Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Niooud, 2003).
Despite this surge in interest, several crucial issues still hinder the development of spatial economics
and its application to a range ofpolicy issues. F irst, despite some claims to the con:baty, the New

Economic Geography (NEG) is not the tmdisputed framework ofreference on alllhings spatial
lnS!tead. it cohabits somewhat UDeaiSily with the older approach ofm:ban systems theory that builds on
Henderson' s (1974) pioneering wook There have been some attempts to reroncile these two
furmeworl<s (Fujita, Krugman and Mori, 1999, Tabuchi, 1998) but at this poi.nt we are still missing a
clean comparison between the two approaches. Second, despite a very large ll11.Il100r ofextensionc;.,
mmy itmportant dimensions ofthese models remUn. under-explored This problem is particularly acute

from a pohcy perspective, where the most policy-relev.mt issues - imperfect labour mobility, local
regulationc;, labour force p<nticipation etc - have attracted the least attention. Third, both urban
systems and NEG models are very difficult to wotk v.rith and are thus still \l"efY poorly understood
beyond their narrow circles of contributors, tvm ci.rcles which, somewhat surprisingly, do not exlnbit
nruch overlap. Possibly as a result ofthese three problems, these approaches have yet to make rug

headway in Influencing regional and m:ban policy.

In an attempt to address these issues, this paper proposes a u.nified diagrammatic framework, which

enCOI11p3Sses both urban systems and NEG. This diagrammatic framework helps highlight the key
similarities and differences bet\veen the approaches and is also armnable to ·extension to give insights
on a range ofpolicy issues. 1be rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we :fust
highlight the key ingredients ofany consistent theoiy of agglomeration and the a4justment ofthe

spatial economy to shocks. We then introduce our d:iagr.umnatic framework. In seotion 3, we use it to
compare the wban systems approach to NEG and discuss thei.r common ground and highlight their
differences. In section 4, we show that our diagrannnatic :framew<>Jk is flexible enough to
acoonunodat e a number of existing extensions to both approaches. In section S, we apply our
diagr<mm.la.tic :framework to a nwnber ofnevir ·extensions focusing our attention, in p<nticular, on the
Dl05t policy-relevant issues.

Before turning to the next section, we v;rant to make it d ear that we would not advocate the wholesale
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ceplacemmt of formal models by graphs in this, oc any, field of research. Ultimately, any fully-fledged
unified approach to regional and m:ban ·economics wil.l have to rely on formal models_1 We only view
our diagrammatic approach as a first step, a step that is particularly useful for the pre.li.minary
exploration of well-articulated problems that can be very diffirult to model more formally_In addition,

diagrams are, ofcoutSe, often very efficient tools \"\-rith which to explain eoonomi.c theories to shldeots
and policy-makers_

2. A diagrammatic analytical framewo•·k
Most economic theories concerned with agglomeration and how places respond to shocks have a
common m:lderlying struc:tufe even ifthis is not always appal'ent at fu5t sight Om objective is fu:st to

identify this common structure and consider the assumptions of any consistent theoretical fuunewooc
Any model of a spatial economy has to contain tfu:ee elements: A spatial structure, a production
structure, and some assumptions about the mobility of goods and factOIS_

Spatial sfructme: Evidently, the geographical space must be divided into some number ofunits,

covering cities or regions in the rol.Ultry (we \);rill call both oftbese 'areas1 _2 The nmnber of areas is
often taken as given but in pr.rotice fuis ooed not be the case_ New areas can be created either by

private land developeu; (as in the US) or ttnough local or central. government action (as in most oftbe
EU). Given a selection of areas, the model must define both.an extema1 and an interml geography_
The external geography is about how the areas are related to each other, while the internal geography
is concerned \vith the internal structure of the area (land. holllSing, infrastmcture etc)_ Iftbe focus is on

linkages between places, the external geography is obviously crucial, as it V4'ill detemJine the clwmels
tfu:ough which a change in one area.affeets others_It is often taken to be exogenous, but this need not
be the case as the distance between areas can change. for example as a result of changes in policy or

technology_A number of factors may also change the internru geography of areas_
Prodllcliofl stmctllre: Assumptions on the local availability ofprimary and inteoned.ia:te inputs play a

crucial role_Of the primary inputs, .most important is l.abour_1 Detailed modelling of labour is required,
both to captur;e di:fferent skill levels and to allow for labour force participation dec-isions_Intermediate
inputs may also pl.ay a crucial rule_It is possible to specify directly an aggregate production fimotion

1

Among many reasons, we would Ull.derscore that <c-hecking the consistency of forma] models is much easier
than that of diagrams_F onnal models also lend themselves well to ·q uantitative execcise>, v.•hich can only be
sketched with diagrams_
2
Our focns is only on sub~national applications of1!hese models_
3
The role of land for produc-tion has receiv-ed smprisingly little attention_ H is ignored in NEG, while in the
mban systems liteuture it plays a key role in housing. but not production
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relating primary and intennediate inputs to some final output Often this is not very enlightening.
Instead, assumptions about the nature ofproducts (partirul:arly the degree of product differentiation),

the input-output structure and the degree of fum Jevel increasing returns will determine the extent and
mture of any aggregate mcreasin:g retmns. 4 Imperl'ect competiti.o n, resulting from fum level
indivisibilities, usually lootllS large in the analysis.

Mobility ofgoods a11dfaclors: Assumptions about mobility, both between and within areas, play a
crucial role in determining the spatial structure of the economy. These assumptiom should cover the
geographical mobility of goods. services, ideas, technologies, and primary fllctOIS. The extent to which
material inputs and outputs are tradable clearly varies across seotors. Some acfur'ities ace ' footloose'
w blle others ace necessarily tied closely to the mrukets that they serve. The m obility of ideas and
technologies will detemllile how the production fimction varies across space. Finally, asswnptions on

pri:mruy factors are crucial Land is immobile, although its availability for use in different activities

(e.g_, housing VeiSUS agriculture) is endogenous. Capital is often taken as highly mobile, with the same
supply price in aD areas. The (imperfect) mobility of labour is a frmdamental issue that warrants
carefultreatmmt. The conjtmction of some form of increasing returm \\'ith impelfect mobility is the

main driver of the clustering ofeconomic: activity and a key determinant of the way in which l.i.nk3ges
between areas operate. Assessing the strength of such chlstering, its range across space, and its srope
across industrial sectOIS is of key importance, as v.rill be clear from our detailed discussion below.

Before continuing, '\lire Jmke three remarks. First, the analysis of linkages between cities and regiom is
inherently a 'general equilibriwn' problem, in which tbe researcher has to look beyond the direct (or
impact) effect of a change and assess the induced changes that follow. Doing this is possible only if
there is a clear analytical :framewot:k within which the various effects interact. Second, the exact level
of spatial disaggregation selected cannot be pre..OOtermined and depends on the questions being

addressed and the availability of data.. 1b:i1:d, the usefulness of different levels of sectmal
disaggregation for production is aJso a oontext specific matter of modelling judgement Put differently,
the levels of spatial and sectoral disaggregation are contingent to the problem under scrutiny.

Eljllilibrillm aml.its perturbatio11: With these ingredients in place the general! equilibrium of the
system can be characterised, in which locati.on choices ;u;e made and wages, rents, and income levels
determined. The eqnilibriUDI may be c:onc;trained in the short nm. because of supply rigidities or factor
i.mmobilities that in the longer nm. are remo'lr>ed.

4

See Duranton and Pnga (2004) for more on the micr~>-fomtdatioru of urban agglomeration economie!l~
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To understand the worlcings ofthese models, it is insightful to won:y about bow, given some :initial
simation (that tmy either correspond to a short nm or a long nm equilibrium), the system adjusts to
·shocks' to the economic environment Thinking about the effects of such shocks is also furubmental
from a policy perspective_ There are three sorts of shocks to be considered each of which may result in

different kinds of adjustment to the urban or regional system The first we tenn ' location specific.'
shocks_ That is, some change, which has its direct impact on a single area;; for example, the

construction ofnew houses or the closure of a f<lctory. The second are 'common' shocks. These are
shocks, the direct impact of whi.ch is felt in many areas_ Examples are technological or institutional
changes. The third sort ofshock is •mtegtative' _This OCCUIS where the inter-area geography changes,
as when a road is built or telecomnnmications improved. Such a cbcmge will have its own effects,
possibly causing relocation of some activities, as \¥el.l as changing the economy' s response to other

shocks_

Chan11els ofadjusllmmt: An economic shoc:k changes rclative prices and ilndm:es changes in
quantities - relocations of activity - between areas_ There are potentially many channels of

adjustment. Foflowing, say, a positive productivity shock somewhere, firms and worlrers may relocate,
wages and/or rents may go up, the price of some final and intermediate goods may change, etc_As will
become dear below, the theoretical literature often makes fairly extreme assumptions about the
mobility of goods and worlre£s and fue determination ofprices_Such simplifications are ~rammted

when the objective is to clarify some aspect ofthe work:ings of the urban/regional system or replicate
~ stylised filets_However these

simplifications also ln1ply that the channels of adjustment aft·e r a

shock are reduced to one or two, whilst most ofthe others are arbitrarily shut down by the extreme

nature of the assumptions_For policy purposes, howe\l""er, these channels of adjustment are everything_
For instance, the welfare effect ofa negative location specific shock: may differ substantially if the
adjustment takes place through a reduction in l.abour force participation as opposed to out-migration.
In this respect, we do not know of any theoretical model of system of c.i.ties or economic geography in
which the participation dec.i..sion ofwotkers is endogenous_The only channel through wh.i.ch labour
supply is 1!lSUally assumed to adjust is in and out-migration to and :from the area_ When trying to
understand why some cities are specialised while others are diversified, this is an accq>table

stmplifi.cation. When trying to understand how declining industrial cities :from Pittsburgh to Li"'elpOOl
have adjusted after negative shocks, it is important to c.onsider a variety of channels of adjustment,
including out-migration but also participation decisiom, etc.
The main problem when considering a variety of channels ofadjustment is that the algebra becomes

very quickly intractable. .A.s we disoussed in the introduction, our choice here is to go instead for a

graphical.exposition. As will become clear below, a graphical exposition can allow for a nruch more
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flexible set of assumptions v.i thout neglecting the key .rdationships that govern what happens Vi.tithi.n

areas and bem•een areas_We first sketch our graphical device befo.re turning to its main applications.
L.flbonr dema11d: The first key relationship ofboth urban systems and NEG is the area level aggregate

production function relating total output in an area to tbe local inputs_This relationship has received a
considerable ammmt oftheoretical attention_ The main spatial featur:e that the literature bas attempted
to replicate is "agglomecrtion", Le., the ronce:ntiation ofa disproportionate slme of economic activity
i.n a small set of areas_A compelling (and sufficient) condition for agglomeration i.s the existence of

(aggregate) increasing retw:ns at the area level Modelling agglomeration in this way is also consistent
with a second major stylised tact: the increase ofmost measures ofproductivity per capita with the

size of the loedl population_ Deriving a local aggregate prodoction fimction, which exhibits increasing

retw:ns willlout the marlret structure being degenerate (e.g., a single p.roduoer per ar-ea), is a significant

cllallenge_
~te this,

the literature bas been fairly successful at proposing mi.croeconomic fou.ndations for Sl!lCh.

local increasing returns_These microfolDl.dations typically rely on one ofthree key mechanisms:
sharing. matching o.r learning. Sharing mecbanisins emphasise how small indivistbiliti.es (like the med
oosts associated with the production of a new local variety) can be aggregated to generate increasing

returns because a larger local population allows every fixed cost to be spread over a larger number of
customers. Matching me.chanisms show how larger m.arlrets increase tbe quality ofmat.ches betv.'eell
economic agents. and/or the probability of finding a match. Matching issues are important in a wide
variety of contexts from the local labour marlret (employer-employee) to the local nmk:ets for

intermediate goods. Finally, learning mechanisms aim to show how more frequent dif;ect .interactions
between economic a:geots in denser environments favour the creation, difliusion and acCI.1DD.llation of

knowledge (see Du:r.mton and Puga, 2004, for a review)A key feature that emerges from the literature on the microeconomi.c foundations of agglomeration is
that many different mec:h.allisms all lead to a local production function that exhibits increasing returns_

For our ptuposes, this is a -..rery positive result because one can 3SSl.1llle some fonu of local increasing
returns without having to rely on a specific mecl!anism The negative counteq>art of this result is that
i.deo1ifying the precise sources ofaggl01l1fifati.on \liill be diffirul.t (Rosenthal and Strange. 2004). "When

concerned with policy, the second caveat is that these local increasing returns derive from specific
market failures. Thus, production is in general inefficient, in the sense that it does not make the best

possible use of local resources. lbi.s suggests a role for policy. but the appropriate corrective policies
will depend on the exact mecha,n1srn at play: tbe corrective polici.es associated with urban knowledge

spi.ll-overs are not the same as those stemming from imperfect matching on the labour market
However since the state ofour knowledge about tbe exact sources of agglomeration economies is still
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very itn:Jpr;ocise-. it is legitimate to sbrt from such local aggregate production ftmctions and take them
asgrven.

If we assume that the three primitive factOIS of production are Jand, labour and capital and if

furthermore land is peJfectly inunobile while capital :is perfectly mobile, the focus of our attention
needs to be on labour_Rather tmn on output per worker as fim.ction of the size of the local workforce,

it is technically equivalent but more :frnitful in teml'> of interpretation to focus our attention on an
m'lr"efSe-demand for labour relating fue wage of workers to the size of the local labour force. 1bis curve
is represented mfigme ta and we will refer to it as a 'wa:ge curve' in what follows. Consistent with

the cmpiri.calliter.rture, the wage in area i as a fuoction of the local labour force. -w{NJ , is assumed to
be mcreasmg mthe size ofthe labour force reflecting the existence oflocal agglomeration
externalities.

The intensity ofthe local increasing retwns is captured by the slope of the wage CUI1le. Of cow:se, a
neo-classical inverse wage curve would be downward s loping siloc:e the amount of land is fixed so the
mugina1 product of labour decreases with city size and fhl1ing land per wortrer. Whether one should
consider a concave or convex upward sloping curve for u{Ni) depends on the spec.ifi.cs of the

microecononiic fmm.dations.5 However, this is ultirmtely an empirical issue. Our concern. here is how
the changes in the wage curve affect the equilibrilDll and how the slope of the ou:rve determines
adjos.tment. Note that, at this stage, it is easier to assume that workers are either identical or are

horizontally differentiated (i.e_, all eqmlly productive but specialised in different activities). Vertical
differentiation (ice., a workforce whel"e some wotkers are more productive l:ban others) is ignored for
the time being but its main consequences will be explored later.

Area crowdi11g: Ibe second crucial relationship concerns the various c.osts assoc-iated with having a
significant m.m1ber of households living in the same area and so we will talk of a 'oost of living ourve, .
The main components ofthe cost of living are the oost of COIDDll.Jting, housing and other consumption
goods. The key question regards the shape of the cost of living cwve as a fimction of the size of the
loc.al population. It seems reasonable to assume that commuting costs increase wi:th population

because a. larger popl!llation implies longer ooDli1Dlles and more oongested roads. Similarly, one
expects increasing population to drive up the cost ofland and thus of housing. However, the impact of
area size on the cost ofconsumption goods is more complicated. A higher oost of land will have
implications for the price of consumption goods throughout the local economy (higher retail oosts etc).

' For instance-. the popular two-stage production func-tions derived from the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977} model of
monopolistic competition generate a conv ex: \\rage curve while those derived from Salop ( 1.979) imply a c.onc ave
curve.
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On the other hand, a. larger ma:rket offers a \¥:ider variety of suppliers without having to import goods

from elsewhere.

Two additi0113l factors, \li'hich do not depend on loc.a] market size, may also be important in

determining the cost of living. First, external geography plays a role here because importing goods
from other areas may be costly and these costs will be captmed by this curve as well. Second, and
particnlarty crucial from a policy pe~spective, land-use and planning regulations will also have an
impact since they affect the supply of land.

We represent this curve

mfigure 1b where we assume that the cost of living increases with popW.ation
6

(the alternative case will be discussed further below). For reasons that will berome obvious, this

cw:ve is represented \vith a reversed Y -axis. 'fo be able to use this curve in a simple and tractable way,
w e Imke two simplifying assumptions when drawing it The first one is that the cost of living is paid
W. monetacy terms only. 'The serond is that housing consumption per household is fixed_ These two
simplifications imply that changec; to the wage cwve will leave the cost of living ourve l.Dl.changed In
reality, conumlfing costs have both a monetary and a time component so an increase iln the wage rate
W.oreases the shadow cost of comnmting and thus shifts the cost of living curve dowmvw1s on the
figure. By the same token, an increase in the wage rate tends to W.crease demand for housing and thns
land, making land nrore ,expensive_ Again, this would shift the aost ofliving curve down\\'3fds_It is

important to note that more founal modelling ,e (fher ignores these effects or suggests they are second
order and thus do not completely offset the direct effect ofa shock to the wage curve. Hence, to keep

the exposiition simple, we ignore these effects in what follows. It would, however, be easy (though
cumbersome) to consider them

Like the wage cmve, the po-sition and slope ofthe cost of living curve reflects a range ofmarket
Cillwes, w-hich means that outcomes may be inefficient. For instaru:e., m-priced wban congestion will
imply an W.efficieotly ltigh cost ofliving for any level ofpopulation. We will treat these i.neffi.cienc.i.ec;
as given, just like those associated v.;i tb the microeconomics of production, since the object of this
paper is not their detailed study. This doec; not, however, pre\l'ellt the analysis of the broader
implications of, for instanre, a reduction iln congestion in the centre of a large capital city due to
congestion charging (e.g., London) or the construction of a mass-transit system (e.g., Bogota). For

such change<;, \"\-'e consider that tb.e main direct effect is to shift the cost of living curve for thec;e citiec;
upW'3l"ds. That is, to reduce the cost of living for a given population size. Ohanges to the supply of land

for housing as, say, local planning regJ!llations are relaxed will shift the curve similarly .

6

For 1he moment, we assmne that everyone living in a city works so that we can use 1he tenns population and
labour force interohmge.ably. Later, when considering issues oflabour force participation we will need to
distinguish between the rnro .
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The di:ffemnoe between the wage CllliVe and the cost of living cmve is represented in figure k 1bis

curve represents the net disposable wage fm the area and thus V\re call it the 'net wage cunre'. In the
case of figure l c, the curve is bell-shaped. Tlris correspon~ to the traditional case ofurban economics

where agglomeration economies dominate crowding costs for a small population, \liWe the reverse
occurs fm a large population. Fm this to be the case, the slope ofthe wage curve must be larger than

that ofthe cost of living curve below a certain threshold, while it is smaller above this threshold~ At
this threshold, the net wage reaches its peak (point Bin the figure). This peak can be interpreted as

identifying an optimal city size.7
Labour Sllppl.J·: The second curve represented in figure tc is an irnverse labour supply curve. It

indicates for any level ofreal wage, how nmch l:a:bom is supplied in the area. For simplicity, \7\re
temporarily assume that labour supply is a ftmction of the total local population and ignore labom
fmce participation decisions. In that case,. this ,curve esseotially captmes the migration response to
local \1i'<lges. A low level of mobility between areas will be captured by a very steep la:bom supply
cw:ve (i.e., even large wage differences do not impact nmch.on migration flows), \lfhile perfect
mobility will imply a flat labour supply cmve (ie., small V\'<lge differences imply large migration
flov.-s). Area specmc effects, such as amenities, will shift this cmve, with a more attractive area facing
a labour supply curve that is below that of a less attractive area (wotkers accept a lower real wage but
are compensated by bigber amenities).

Eqllilibrinm: The internection between the la:bom supply and net wage curves determines the
equilibrinm of the model. The intersection between these two curves may not be unique. In figure lc,
the two curves inte:Isect twice {at A and q. The labour supply curve first ruts the net wage curve from

above (at A) and then from below (at q. Point A is not a stable ,e quilibrium It is easy to see that a
smill positive population shock will raise the net wage.. In nun, from the supply omve, v;.oe see this

higher net wage attracts more wor:lrers, which again I3.ises net wages and this process continues tmtil
the area reaches point C. By the same token, a negative shock at point A will lead population and
wages to fall t,e zero. Turning to the Sft:Ond interBection in C, a slmilar argument verifies lhat this

.. .

.

.

.

.

.

*

equilibrinm liS stable~ From figure 1c., once we have established the equili.Driwn populatl.on ( N ) at

.

.

.

*

pomt C, we can trace up\lomds to figures la and lb to read off the equilibrium wage ( w ) and cost of

living (lt ), respectively.
1

More accurately, this is the constrained optimal ci.ty size, Optimality here is conditional on the loc.a.l wages
being optimal given the population. As shown by Duranton and Puga (2004), unconstrained optimality is
unl.il:e]y to occur since it requir'e s :m effic.i ent production prooess in the area while, as we disoussed earlier in the
text, the assumptions needed to generate agglomention usually require some maiket failnre. Hence
agglomeration is in general associated with inefficient production and the opti.ma.l!ity of city size is constrained
by that inefficiency.
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3. A diagrammatic comparison of systl'ms of citi.l's and NEG

In this section, vore show that our <tiagramrmtic framework can be used to explain the workings ofboth

thewban systeo:J5 and NEG literatme. We begin v;rith Henderson' s(l974) system of cities model
before turning to NEG.

Urhau systems
Henderson (1974) assumes that there are local increasing returns taking place \vithin itndnstries

(localisation economies). This implies that the wage cur\l'e is as in figure la but specific to each sector.
Different sectors :may show different degrees of increasing returns. Figure 2a represents the wage
curve for two different industries, 1 and 2. as afimcJion oflocal industry employment. In the figure,
industry 2 exhlbits stronger increasing returns than industry 1.a: These final goods are assruned to be

freely tradable so that there is no issue of market access.9 We assume that the cost of living depends on
the total workforce in the city and this relationship is dra\w in figure 2b.
The :fu:st result of the model, that an cities \vill. be fully specialised in equilibrium, follows :from the
assumption toot increasing returns are incfustry specific, but the cost of fu.'"ing depends on total

workforce. The reasoning behind this result is fue foUowing. Imagine that instead ofbeing fully
specialised. a city has positive employment in both i.n:dffitry 1 and 2 With workers being mobile
between industries, the equilibrium requires wage equalisation between the two industries. The only

possible interior equilibrium nmst be where the two cmves intersect. Assume then a small shock,
which moves ,e mployment to industiy 1 at the expense of industiy 2. Such a shook will imply a higher
wage in industry 1 and a lo\\-rer wage in industry 2. This in tum will imply IDO!'e worlrecs moving from
industry 2 to in.dustiy 1, etc. The only stable equilibrimn nmst thus involve the fuJI specialisation of

each city in either industiy 1 or indusby 2.

As discussed above, provided that at some pomt the marginal increase in cost of living begins to

dominate the marg[nal increase in \\rages in industries 1 and 2. the net wage curve will be bell-shaped
for both industries. These two rucves are represented in figure 2c. Note that optimll city size is larger
for industry 2. with the stronger increasing returns. Assume that labour is perfectly mobile across

8

Note that in figure 2a, the wage curves for the two industries. cross. Assuming that both goods are indispensable
then, in equilibrium, prices ofthe t\vo goods must adjust to emure that this is fue c~. If the tv.-o curves did not
cross, one activity would ahvays pay more and thus attract all the worl:ers. and the other good would not be

f~:::~sts,

which imply th:U :m.a.rl:et access matters, introduce further c.omplicati.ons, which are dealt with in
the ,expo!rit:ion of the NEG fi:amevi.rorlr_

9

c-ities so that the labour supply rurve is flat This implies that the short-n.m. ,e quilibriwn will be gi.ven

by points A and B, "With net v."<lge the same in both cities and the population N A and N B for the cities
specialised in indllsby 1 and 2, respec;tively.

At this stage, two importmt propes:ties must be noted. First, all cities will be too large with respect to
their constraioed optimal city size following the same stability argwnent as previously.

10 11
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Second, all

cities with the same specialisation nmst be ofthe same size. lt is interesting to note that this prediction
receives Dlild empiri.c al support (Henderson, 1988).
The crucial issue "Wifb regard to long nm equilibrium concerns the mechanism for city creation. In the
long run, the DIJ.Dd>er of cities irs not fixed but instead can vary depending on the action of land

developers. The model assu.IlrS that these developers can Cl"'eate cities of a size oftheir choosing and
C3!ll use fiscal

instruments to appropriate rent to finance their activity. The optimal strategy of a

competitive land developer is thus to create a city of optimal :size and tax the workefi the difference
between the real wage that the city o :ffelS and the real wage that can be obtaffied elsewhere. As

worket:s move to the newly created ,cities, they leave old established cities. A decline in the size of the
latter "Will increase the net wage they can offer to their wod::fl5_In 1um, this dampens the incentive for
further new c-ities to be developed In equil.ibrimn, the :free-entry of c.ompeti.tive developers will imply
that aJl cities will reaoh their optimal size.

This irs not the end ofthe story, however. Note that in figure 2c the peak of the indllsby 2 curve (the
maximum real wage payable in an optimally sized industJ:y 2 city) lies above the peak ofthe industry 1

cwve. lbat is, cities in md1Jstry2 can offer a higher \\"<lge at their constr.rined optimal size. However,
these differences cannot persist in equilibrium."With competitive land developers because they imply

higher returns for building indnstry 2 cities. These higher re1ums induce the development of relatively
more new citi.es specialised in indl!lstiy 2_ Thns output in industry 2 inCI'eases more than output in
i.ndustiy 1 and this causes the relative price of industry 2 ' s final good to decline. This dedine in price,

pushes down the demand for labour in mcmstry 2 and so the wage cmve moves downwards. 1bis
10

It is important to note that cities are O\'ersized only v.ith respect to their constrained optimal size (ie., the
=optimal" size, wmch ignores ineffic-iencies in both produc:otion and hoUiSingfco:mmuting). If for instance
production is inefficient in figure 2a, it may well be the case fua.t the fust~best wage cmve is above the
equilibrium wage cmve v.l]th a steeper slope. This steepa first-best wage cmve would imply an unconstrained
optimal city size larger (and posSioly mw:h largei-) fuan the constrained optimal
Then the comparison
between the futly optimal city size and fue eqllihorinm 'c ity size is iUIIbiguons since fuere are two distortions
pushing in opposite directions. On the ·o ne hand, without a mai.ket for cities, equilibrium city size is too large. On
the ·o ther hand, all the benefits from agglomeration are unlikely to be exhausted, v.rhich implies eql!li.horium c ity
size being too smalL As discussed in the text, in reality, we also expect important inefficiencies Teganting fue
detennination of the cost of living. Such ineffic-iencies. are like:ly to increase the gap between the c:,onstrained and
WlOOnstrained optimal city SUe.
11
Note that fuis result is to some extent an artefact ofperlec:.t b.bom mobility. With an upward sloping labom
!rupply cnnre, equilihriliiiD. city size can be stable in the region. of increasing Tetmns_See below for more an fuis_

me.
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process continues Wl.til op1imal city size is the same for both types of cities. Tbis long mn equilibrium

is shown in figure 2d Developers tmke zero profit for both.types ofcities, all types of cities reach
thcir optimal size and worlrers receive the same net wage evefY\lihere. Fina.lly, citi.es export the good

they produce and import all other goods.
This model is still a landmark in the literature, providing the first consistent model of an urban system

in which cities arise eodogenomly from a tension between agglomeration economies and urban

crowding while interacting together through trade. The useftllness of this m.odei for policy purpose
remains, however, limited Consider for instance a negative productivity shock in a given city (which
reduces the margjnaJ! productivity of labour by a given proportion). 'T he net wage at the optimal c.ity
size will end l!lp below that offered in other cities_ Workers will move out of this city and a land
developer wiU choose an empty site to develop another city of optimal size_.Alternatively, a negative

common productivity shock affecting all cities of a given type will lead to cities of smaller size and,
depending on the substitntrbility between goods, more or less cities of that type_These examples

clearly show that the ultimate margin of adjustment m. the model is the number of cities_In tum,
adjos.ting the nmnber ofcities depends cruc.ially on the assumption ofperfect labour mobility. Oeady,
cities do not enter and exit the urban landscape hke this, particularly in European countries where the

activity of land developers is severely restricted._12
Despite its drawbacks for policy analysis, this model has served as a stnting point for much of the
subsequent theoretical work on urban systems (see Duranton and Puga, 2000, for a survey ofthis

literature}. Unfortunately, most ofthe extensions ofthis fuu:nework are concerned with only two
issues: providing more detailed or alternative microeconom.ic foundations for the wage curve and
genernting more realistic predictions for the composni.on of economic activity m. c.ities, since full
specialisa.tion is obviously too extreme.. These extensions, however, do not tackle the problem of the
eoiiy and exit of cities (Helsley and Strange., 1997, and more recently, Henderson and Venables. 2004,

are rare exceptiom) or the issue ofitmperfect labour mobility. Later m. the paper, we oomider the issue

of labour mobility as well as a nUDlber ofpolicy mlevant extemions, but for now we leave the w:ban
systems literature and twn our attention to NEG.

12
In contrast, in countries with fast growing populations, city creation is offimdamenta I importance to avoid the
c.onoentration of population in a few grossly oversized cities_ The exit of citie:s. remains a much more contentious
issue. First, Emopean governments are highly reluctant to let fa.iliDg cities experience sustained population
declines_Second, even in the absence ofpolic.i·es to pre\•ent exits, real exits are rare occurrences_This is because
an existing stock of housing capital is very .s low to depreciate. Low rents, possibly falling below the rental c.ost
ofc:apita.l, allow dedining cities to retain oome population . A complete analysis ofthe appropriateness of these
policies is.beyond the s.oope ofthis paper.
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New Ecollomic Geograplty

Despite very significant modelling di.ff'erences, the core models ofNEG can be explained with the
same graphical devi(je_1bis is because, as we argue below, a wage ourve and price index (ie., cost of
living curve) lie at the heart ofNEG mode-ls. As above, the difference between the nominal \vage and

the cost of living curve then defines a net \lo"'<lge curve and assumptions on labour mobility between
13

areas allow one to deri"'e the long-run equihDriwn The use of our graprucal dev ice i.s, hov,"ever,

tmde more di fficult in NEG because in some core models (e.g., Krugman, 1991), the wage equation
and the price index do not admit closed-fOIID solutions_To get rotmd this difficulty, we can citber rcly
on numerical solutions for specific parameter vahJes or instead use variants ofthese core models that
can be solved analytically (Ottaviano, Tabuchi. and Thisse, 2002, and Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003).

Models in the line ofKmgman (1991) consider two areas and 1\\-'0 sectors_14 For ease of exposition in
what follolN-s, we appeal to NEG' s roots in intermtioml trade and refer to the first area as ' Home' and

the second as 'Foreign' . The first sector produces sODie homogenous good tmder constant ret:u:ms. To
simplify the derivation of the model, this good is assumed to be pelfectly tradable (so that its price is

·equal mboth .a reas and can be normalised). This sector is often referred to as ' agriculture' or identified
with some traditional good for which wcnkers are immobile both geographically and sect.orally (i.e.,
they always work in this homogenous good sector)_ Given these mobility assumptions, the wage in
this sector can then be derived directly from the nonnalised price of the good it produces. For

empirical and policy purpose, it i.s enough to assume the existence of some autonomous or residual
demand in each area (e_g_, c-ivil servants, pensioners, de) so that this sector can remain in the
ba-okground, whi.le attention focuses on 'manufacturing' . Manufacturing consists ofa m.unber of firms,
each operating with internal economies of scale and producing their individual variety ofdifferentiated

product This sector is monopolistically competitive as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Assumptions on
the substitutability between goods enswe that all consumers dem:md all varieties and so each finn
sells i1s output in both areas. Thus if manufl.cturing is operating in both areas, there is •intra-i.ndus.try
tiade· . However, the presence oftransport rosts means that fum;' sales have a ' home-muketbias'_ 15
Manufactl!lring workers are mobile and go to the area that offeJ:S them the highest utility_

13

Note that for the 'e ase of presentation the prioe index is subtracted from the wage, instead ofdiv.iding the wage
by l:his index. For this to be technically 'c orrect, both the wage OUIVe and price index. shou]d be dmwn on a log
scale~
14

The properties below are those ofForslid and Ottaviano' s (2003) model, which differ only minimaUy from
Krugman 0 991) _
H The literature also uses the concept oftrade ,c.osts. ratha- than transport costs. We think of the forma- as a
broader concept, which encompasses tr.msport oosts rogether v."ith maD.J' other costs associated with trading
goods remotely. For our pmpose, we take these two concepts to be ,equivaJent.
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Ibe wage ofthe workers in the manufuctw:ing sector in an Mea is represented by the \"\' age rurve in
figure 3a. The shape of the wage curve is the result of a subtle tra<Je..off bet\vee:n two opposing force£:

a crowding effect on the product market and a home-matket ·effect_1be resolution of dri.s trade-offand
hence the slope oftbe curve, depends on the level oftransport costs. For hi.gh transport costs, the wage
curve is downward sloping (the plain curve), whi.le for low 1ra:nsport costs it is upv;rard sloping (the
dashed curve}.

To better understand this, consider Home (symmetric argwnents hold for Foreign) and assume that
employment in the rnamlf.acturing sector is arbitrarily small in Home (and thus most man:uf3cturing
activity takes place in Foreign} Note that with. high transport costs, manufacturing goods produced in

Foreign will be expensive in Home. Hence, not only does Home have relatively few producers bnt
these producers are also protected from imports by high transport costs_They can thus charge high
prices, which imply high wages for the workers employed in manufacturing in Home. Hence, when
the mrumfacturing wotkforce in Home is small and transport costs are high, Home pays high
mrurufacturing wages. Now, continue to make the same assnmption on the shares of employment in
the two different areas, hnt assume that tr<WSpOrt costs are veTf low. With low tr.msport costs, the
protection -enjoyed by mannfucturing in Home is eroded. In tum, this leads to lower mam:l.'fucturing
prices and thus lower '\'irages in Home_Hence, when the manufiu:turing labour force is small in an area.,
local \\'ages are increasing in tr.msport ocms..

Consider now the effect on the '\'irage of an increase in the size ofthe tmn.ufacturing workforce in

Home. There are m'O offsetting effects. First, a larger workforce in mamlfaoturing means a larger
income in Home. Given tmt transport cos.ts are positive, this extra demand will disproportionatcly
benefit Home producers. This is the home market effect and it tends to increase wage. Note that the
home madcet effect is weaker when tr:msport costs are low. 1bis is because lower transport costs :rmke
d easier to import foreign goods. Consequently, when Home income increases following an expansion

of the manufacturing workforce, a greater sbar:e oftbat increase \vill be devoted to manufacturing
goods produced in Foretgn when transport costs are lower.

Ibe second effect of a larger manufacturing work force is that there are more firms, which crowds the
product market VJhen transport costs are high, tbe dermnd from Foreign will be low and the market
faced by the Home firms will essentially boil down to the Home muk:et. Then, a larger manufacturing
workforce implies more Home :fums but more Home firms simply lead to a more crowded local
product market and this lowers prices and wages. This is the muk:et crowding effect mentioned above.
Note that the market crowding effect is also attenmted for lower tr.msport costs. This is becal!lSe lower
tr.msport costs make it easier to export manufacturing goods so that an expansion ofthe manufacturing
workforce has a less detrimental effect on Home prices (and thus wages). n turns out that for high

13

transport costs, crowding dominates and the \"\'age CUIVe is downward sloping (the solid line in figure

3a)_ In contrast, when transport coSits are low, the home tmrlret effect can dominate leading to an
upward slopitog wage curve (the dashed line in figure 3a)..
The reasons for this reveiSal are quite subtle~ We have already shown above that when the

mmufaduring labour force is small in an area, local wages are increasing ito. transport costs_ We now
show that when the manufacturing labour foroe is large ito. an area, this relationship is reversed
implying that the wage aurve slopes up for low transport costs and down for high transport costs.. To
see this, it is easiest to take a specific example_ Thus, assume that Home employs 50 workers in
agriculture and 100 workers in manufacturing, while foreign empl oys 50 workers i.n each sector_
Consider first the :Dli.Mket crowding effect, which depends on the number of mannfacttu:ing firms in

Home relative to the size ofthe nnf.ket for those firms_.As transport costs decline, the manufactw:ing
sector in Home gradually gains a better access to 100 consumers.. Hence, as transport costs decline
from infinity to zero, the marketfor mamifac111Tingfl1717S located in Home increases from 150 to 250,
i.e., by 66%. Consider now the home market effect, which depends on the shafe of home

mmufacturing :fums i.n the pmchases of Home COilSUIDf:[S_ As transport costs decr:ease, workers i.n
Home spend a rugber fraotion of their manufucturing expenditure on imported goods. More
specifically, when transport coots are itnfini.te, Honr consumers buy their manufacturing varieties from

the home rrumubcturing sectors, that is from tOO manufuctnring wodrers_When transport costs are

zero, they can buy their manufaoturing goods from manJJJiacturing in both areas, that is from 150
mmufacturing workers_Hence, as transport costs decrease from infinity to zero, th2 manufacturing

mllrk2tfor consznners in Home increases by 5(?/o. Put differently, 3iS transport costs decline, the
market for Home producers increases faster than the market for home consumers. Thus market
crowding decre<liSes faster than the home Illalket effect. For sufficiently low transport costs the home
market effect dominates the crowding effect and Home will pay higher wages. That is, for sufficiently
low tr.msport costs, loc~ wages in large areas are decreasing in transport costs. Remembering that the
relationship between local wages and transport costs is reversed for small areas, we see that for low
transport costs the wage curve must be upward sloping while it nmst be do""-nward sloping for high
tlansport costs_

What about the cost of living? By 3iSsumptlon, NEG neglects issues relating to land and housing and

so fue cost of living i.n an area will be determined only by the price itndex. for the imperfectly tr.lded
(ie. manufaduring) goods. When the mamlfacturing wotkforce i.n an area is small, the sbare of
imported goods is large, which puts upward pressure on prices as these goods are subject to transport

costs_ As local m.arket size in.c:reas:es, loc.a] prices are pushed downwards. Consequently, the cost of
living declines v;rith the size ofthe area.
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Lower tr.msport costs have two implications for the cost of living curve. First, it is obviollS tbat,
conditional on the size of the area, the price index is lower when transport costs are lower_ Second,

and sligbtl:y less obvious. the lower transport costs the less important is own area size in detennini.ng
the price iiodex and so the flatter is the oost ofliving curve_Thus

mfigtu:e 3b the dashed line gives the

cost of living with low tr.msport costs, the solid line with high transport costs_

In figure 3c, we report the resulting net wage curve, i.e., the difference between the wage and the cost
of living, for both high and low transport costs_ In each case, there is a symmetric curve for the other
area since the swn of the population ofboth areas is a constant_Thus we can draw the curves for both
areas on the same figure (with a thick line for Home and a thin line for Foreign), the distance between
the two vertical axes being equal to the total popula1ion.. For high transport costs, the relevant net wage
cw:ves are represented by the solid lines which are decreasing: net -wage declines \\-ri:th the size of the

loc.al mannfacturing population since both the nominal v.13ge and the cost of living increase_Both
curves intersect for areas ofeqml size at A which represent the symmetric equilibrium The
·equ.ilibrinm is stable in this case.. To see this, imagine shifting a worker to Home from Foreign_ The
net wage falls in Home and ri.ses in Foreign so that the wmke:r ·wishes to move back to Foreign and so
symmeby is restored, In con:ti3St, for low tr.msport costs, the relevant net -wage curves are represented

by the dashed lines, \Vhich are now increasing_ The symmetric equilibrium at B is now unstable_
Again, to see this, imagine moving one worker to Home from Foreign_ In con:lr.lst to the situation with
high tr.msport cost, this pertwbation r.lises the net wage in Home, thus attracting more workers and
further rnsing the net wage_This suggests that with low transport costs., the only stable equilibria

involve concentration in either Home or Foreign. Of course, given that the two areas start out
symmetric, we cannot S3Y which ofthese two equilibria will be reached.
One of the strengths of this class of model is that it allows investigation of i.ntegrntive shocks. Indeed,

in his original paper Krugman (1991) focuses on the question of what happens to the equilibrium as
transport costs are reduced The answer is given by the comparison betv.reen the two kinds of
equilibria m figure Jc_ If transport costs are high, then manufacturing is equally divided between the

two areas, essentially because of the need to supply the immobile co1lS1!lillf:IS_ As transport costs fall, i.t

becomes easier to snpply all COilSllt11efS from a single area At low 1r.msport costs the symmetric
equilibrinm is unstable, and the stable equih.Oria require all manufacturing activity be concentrated m
one of the two areas (with the equilibrium being at either point C or C'. depending on whether the
agglomeration occurs in Home or Foreign, respectively)_16

~shown in Fujita et al (1999), the basic. results ofthis model generalise to a more ,c.ompl ex. geography with
nmltiple areas.
16
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Ibe model demonstr.!tes i.n a particularly sharp way how concentration can arise from mark:et access

effects, even without any externalities ·within the ll13Dllfllcturing sector_ The v."'O:i<: ofKrugman (1991)

has setved as point of departure for a large literature (see Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004, for a survey).
Before turning to these extensions, a comparison between the two frameworks analysed so :fur is

w.uranted

Compari11g the two callonicalmodels
As we discussed in the introduction, 1he approaches based on urban system; and NEG are often

perceived as disjoint and commonly studied and further developed separately, often by different
people. AJthough the approaches do differ, the previous two subsections make it clear that the
difference£ between mban system; and NEG are about the key asswnptions of the models rather than

the nature of the models themselves. In a nutshell, the core model ofm:ban systems relies on local
agglomeration effects and local congestion effects in the context of a large number of areas. NEG
mstead re-ilies on fum level increasing returns and 1he existence of tr.msport costs between a small,
discrete munber of areas.

These assumptions translate into differences for the shape ofthe three mains curves: the \Vage cwve,

the cost of living curve, and the labom supply curve. The wage Cll[\)·e is unequivocally increasing in
the wban system; approach. Because of an sorts of local externalities (technological spillovers, thick
labour market effects and input-output linkages) it is assumed that increasing returns occur in each
area. In contrast in NEG the wage curve may be increasing or decreasing. This is because, as we have

sbo\Jirn, the subtle trade-offbetween a crov;rding effect (a larger workforce leads to an increasingly
crowded local market) and a home market effect (a !Mger world'orce implies a larger local market
which.benefits all local firms) depends on the level of transport costs. Even when the v;•age curve is
llp\li'3fd s loping, there are no pure local extemalities in the NEG model, only pecuniary effects that
ooour because of transport costs and increasing returns to scale at the fum level

Ultitmtely, the most appropriate shape for the \wge cmve is an ·e mpirical question. However, it is
important to note that a priori, the assumption made by the urban systems literature would appear to be
relevant at smaller spatial scales where local externalities are expected to play a role. By rontrast, the
NEG assumptions are better suited to larger sp·a tial units (regi.ons, countries or even groups of
countries) for which. long distm.ce market interactions are expected to play an important role while
short distance effects become of secondary importance..

Tw:ning to the cost of living curve, dlere is again a sharp contr3sl The cost of living increases with
population size for the urban system model while it decreases with size in NEG. Again, as wi.th the
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1.vage ourve, the sbape of the cost of living curve is an empirical issue_However, the spatial scale at
which these theories are applied is likely to matter for this auve as \"~lelL With a more urban focus, the
literature on systems ofciti.e s pays a lot ofattention to rising land and comnn:Itiog oosts. Instead, NEG,
with its more regional perspecfure, views romnmtmg and homing costs as second order :i.ssue5
compared to the importance of umket acc.ess and its impact on the price of ronsw:nption goods.

The :final ourve to consider is the labour Sl!lpply curve. Both sets of models assmne that manu.f.acmring
workers are perfectly mobile betwem. areas and that they will move until net wages are equalised
across areas. There is one subtle difference in that assumptions on the spatial distribution of immobile

workers fiixes a-priori the munber of spatial units in NEG approaches while the ll1.lli1ber of areas is

determined endogenously in the urban systems approach. However, the role of the number of spatial
units turns olllt to be relatively unimportant As shown by Fujita d aL (1999), the results ofthe core
NEG model generme to a larger number ofregions. 17 From om diagrammatic exposition above, it is
clear that the wban systems approach can readily be generalised to a

smalL discrete number of cities

(see Papageorgiou and Pines, 1999, for more on this).

Pulling all ofthis together, we would argne that there is no inherent contradiction between the mban
system approach and NEG: the latter is trying to explain broad trends at large spatial scales while the

former attempts to explain "spikes" of.e cooomic activity. Clearly, bringing these hvo approaches
together in a tmilled framework is an important goal for future r;esearch.lll This is important because
distinguishing empirically betwem. a ''trend"' and a "spike~ is not easy, especially as a series of spikes
can imply a trend when none may be present

19

4. Using our framework "With Pmting extensions of thP system of cities and NEG approaches

In this section, we use our ftamewot:k to consider a number of extensions to the urban systems and
NEG models that bave been proposed in the literature. We start with m.ro extensions to the NEG
approach, before turning to extensions to the urban systems model

The rise andfall ofregional ineq11alities: adding hm1si11g
The c.ore NEG framework can be emiched by ·e ither adding more features on the production side
(changing the wage curve) or more features on the dispersion side (changing the cost ofhving auve).

17
Howe\•er, for policy pwpose the number of areas matters for the nu.niber ofv.'inners and losers and 1he
magoimdes offhe .gajm and losses as the spatial economy adjusts to shocks.
11
See Fujita, Krugman, and Mori (1999) and Tabuchi (1998) for tv,m very different early attempts.
19
We note thai: exiting ·e mpirical work nmally ignore!! this fimdamental issue.
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Regarding the cost of living curve, one particularly mtuca.l extension is to :Unpose some constraints on
land supply by assuming that housing is imperfectly elasti.cally supplied so that house prices are

increasing with population.20 This extension can easily be inootporated in to our diagrammatic
framework by reoognizing tbat the cost of living curve will now depend on both the cost of

consumption goods and the cost of housing. As the size of the area.rises, the price ofconsumption
goods falls (as discussed above) but thi5 full is offset by rising house prices_ At some point, we would
expect rising house prices to dominate and 1hi:s implies a bell-shaped cost of living ClJlVe_Perhaps the

clearest way to picture this is to add together the cost of living curve in figure 1, which captur:es house
prices and congestion, with the curve from figure 3, \vhich captures the price index effect_ This nonmonotonic cost of living curve is represented in Figure 4b. As with the oore NEG model, falling

transport costs will have two effects on this cost of living curve_ First, lower transport costs shift the

cw:ve up. Second, as transport costs decline, the :first part of the bell shape for the cost of living
becomes flatter as mruket access m.a.tters less and less_ At very low transport costs, mruket access is
essmtially irrelevant and the cost of living curve is monotonically increasing mthe size of the
mrurufacturing work force_

For high transport costs, combining the vorage CUI1le from.the core NEG model with a bell-shaped cost

of living curve leaves the net wage curve essentially unchanged compared to figure 3, so symmetric
3ff'2S

is still the only stable equilib:riu.m It is represented by point A in figure 4c_For intermediate

transport costs, a bell-shaped cost of living c;urve implies a bell-shaped net v;rage curve consistent with
~but not complete agglomeration of manufacturing workers

in a single area.. Note tbat this

extension leads to a net v;rage cmve tbat is similar to that in the tuban system approach. This is
parbrnlarly interesting given that the forces driving these two curves are very different. In this case,
the symmetric situation is no longer a stable equilibrium Instead the two stable equilibria at B and B'

involve some agglomeration ofmannf3.cturing in one area or the other_ Finally , when transport cost are
very low, the net wage curv'e now mterseds the net wage curve for the other area in its downward

sloping region_The symmetric situation inC is again a stable equilibritu:n_21
Once again, we can work through the thought ~t of allowing transport msts to fall and think

wmt this implies for equilibrium.. When transport costs are very high, ll13llllfucturing workeiS are
evenly distnlruted across areas because it would be too expensive to serve the agri.cul1:ur31 demand ofa

·periphoar area (no manufacturing) from an agglomerat-ed •cor;e' . Then, for intennediate transport

20

Helpman (199 &) present a fonnal model incorporating this assmnption but changing o1her l:ey asswnp1ions of
the 'c.ore Kingman model In the text, we prefer to use om gzaphical framework to' assess what happens if
housing costs are added to the core Kmgma:n model
21
Both 1he wage and the c.ost of living are increasing iin city size. That the change i.n cost of living ,dominates
depends on the so called ' no bJack b.ole' condilion which impose the necessary constrain1s on the relevant
pacameten
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costs, it pays for man;ufacturing wodcers to agglomerate and ec.onomise on lr.msport oosts while

senrmg peripheral famlers from the core_ Flnally, for low tr.wsport costs, high housing costs in the
core become dominant The effects of market integration on the location of activity are therefore
ambiguous in this type offtamewrnk_ At relatively high levels of transport costs a reduction in barriers
promotes spatial disparities. At lower levels it pennit:s the dispersion of activity and a narrowing of
disparities. This is an example of the funous bell-shaped effect of Diarket integration on regional
inequality.

The rise andfall ofregional i11equalities: addingi11plll-Olllplllli11kages
A similar type of outcome can be obtained from a very different extension ofNEG_Following Puga
(1999) and Krugman and Venables (1995), assume v.-'Orlcers are mobile across sectors (agricnltwe and

mmufacturing) but not across areas. This last assumption allows us to simplify our diagram since
labom mu:ket equilibrium only requires that agrirultnre and manufacturing workers get paid the same
nominal wage r.rther than the same net wage, since all types of \li'orkers in an area w'ill faoe the same

cost of living_22 The agricultural good is fi:ee1y tr.l.dable across areas and is produced using Jabom and
land The \V3ge in agriculture as a fimction of manufacturing employment is represented by the dashed
upward-sloping curve in figures 5 a-c._This line slopes upwards because increased manufacturing
employment in an area implies lowec agrirnltur:il employment, higher land to lalxn.n- ratios in
agriculture and thus higher agricultural wages.

The mannfucturing sector is as in Krugman (1991) with the added complication that existing varieties
are also used as intermediate inputs by manufactming producers_ This implies that the shape of the

wage cwve for manntacturing will be the outcome ofa trade-off between three different forces. First,
and as in Krogman (1991), market c:row<ting SJtill occurs: as the size ofthe manufacturing sector
incceases locally, the price index declines. Under free-enlry, a decline in the price index implies lhat

the maximum wage that produrers can pay also declines_ Second, there is also a home--nw::ket effect as
in Krugman (1991)_ Since workers are imnw:bile geographically, the workings ofthis effect are

slightly different :fr001 that in Krugman (1991). A large manufacturing sector locally ilmplies a larger
mruket for manufacturing goods because the manufacturing sectm consumes its own varieties as input,
whereas in Krogman (1991) the effect was driven by the increase in the nwnber of workers. Third,

there is an additional local increasing return working through cost linkages: A larger local

mmufacturing sector means a greater number of varieties and a lower price index for manufactured
goods, which are used as inputs in t,o the manufacturing process as well as for :fi.na1 COilSllliilption.
Coupled with free entry, this works to partially offset the .effect ofmatket crowding on wages_ Just
22

Note however that welfare analysis requires looking at net wages. Workers in different regions may get paid
different net wages in tills. context.

19

1i1re in Krogman (1991), the crowding effect dontinates when transport costs Me high ".11-ttile the home

muket and cost linkage ,effects become more Unportant for lower transport costs.
The pl.:a:in curve in figure Sa represents the wage curve for mannfactnring in the case of high 1ransport

costs. Consider an increase in the mamlfaotwing workforoe starting from zero employment in
mmufaduring. Cost linkages and the home market effect fust dominate before crowding kicks in and
lowers manufactming wages as the manufactming workforce expands. 1be equilibrium occurs at point
A The plain curve in figure Sb represents the manufacturing wage curve for i:ntennMiate transport

costs. In this case, the home lll3lket effect reinforced by cost linkages dominates the crowding effect
as malll.lfucturing expands. 1bere Me now three equilibria at points B 1, B2, and B1. The equilibrium in

B2 is unstable so that area 1 is either at B 1 while are<~~ 2 is at B3 or area 1 is at B3 while area 2 is at
B l. Compared to At , BJ implies a larger manufacturing w0Ikforce.13 Finally the plaDl rurve in figure
Sc represents the manufacturing wage cwve for low transport rosts. In this case, cost linkages are
much \Veaker so that the rnamJfacturing wage cu1ve is much.flatter than in the previous case. There is

a unique equilibrium. at C. This equilibrium implies a more even <listribution ofmmufadnring than for
mtermediate transport costs. The reason behind this is that c.onoentration ofmamxfacturing in one area
bids up the wage in that area while it dept-esses the wage in the other area.. When tr.msport costs are

low, manufil.oturing in the core area has to ,compete with manufacturing in the peripheral area.. Since
workers are the ~ the only soUf7ce of-wage difference arises from the costs of importing

mtermediates and exporting output. As transport oosts decline, the wage difference between the two
areas has to decline, which implies manufacturing moves back to the periphery. The bell-shaped effect
of market integration is agam obtained.

As shown by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2005), wOJkers tend to sort across cities according to

observed and tmobserved cllaracteristics. More generally, .skilled workers are over-represented in large
cities while unskilled wOik:ers tend to live in smaller cities (Peri, 2002).1nspired by the analysis of
Abdel-Ralumn and Wang (1997), it is possible to show how such a pattern can emerge using our

diagrammatic framewrn:k.. 1be starting point ofthe analysis is to assume that workers with rugher
skills benefit more from agglotnerdtion effects. If, for rnstanoe., agglmmration has a nmltiplicative

·effect on individual productivity (as routinely assumed by empirical studies), the benefits from

agglomeration will increase with skills. Gr-aphically this implies two wage curves, one for skilled
workers and another for tmSkilled workers. This is represented in figure 6a. After taking into account

the cost of li.ving curve, the net wage curves for these two groups of workers are r:epresented in figure
23

Note that B3 could be to the right offue right-band-side the vertical axis, which \\rould imp·]y complete
specialisation in manll!facfuring~
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6c.24 Unsurprisiogly the net wage rurve for skilled wod.rers is above that for 1.10Skilled workers. With
both groups ofworlrers being perfectly mobile and assuming that skilled work:ers enjoy a higher
reseiVation level, the two labour supply curves are also represented in figure 6c.

The equilibrium is represented by points A and B for skilled and unskilled workers. It can be verified

tmt at this equilibrium, skilled workers have no incentive to move to a smaller unskilled cdy while
unskilled workeJ:s would enjoy a 10\"lr'e:I utility by moving to a larger skilled C-ity. Thus, sorting by skill
is an equilibriwn outco:me.

Chm1ges .i11 specialisatio.11 a11d the structurollra11sfo.rmatio.1t ofdties

The extension ofthe wban system framework proposed by Dur.mton and Puga (2005) is useful for

tbmking about the ~formation of the very largest city economies dming the de-industrialisation

period. This model was motivated initially by changes in the US utban system which saw cities
sb:ifling from being predominantly spec.ialised by sector to being specialised by fi.mction (e.g.,

production, management, etc} To model this, Duraoton and Puga (2005) use the Henderson ( 1974)

fram.eworlc but allow the spatial organisation of films to be endogenous.
Firms, in each seotor, require both sector-specific inputs (e.g., car parts for car produ.cers) as well as

business services for their headquarters. There are agglomeration economies in all sectors including
business services. Finns face a trade-off between spatial integration ofboth headquarters and
production facilities and the spatial separation ofthese two fuoctions. If :fums decide to locate their
production facilities and headquarters separately, then both parts of the operation can :fully benefit

from the re-levant agglonleiation extemaliti.es (sector specific inputs for the production :fucdity,
lms.iness services for the headquarters). In contrast, spatial integration allows :lions to manage the
interaction between production facilities and headquarte.J:S more efficiently because they save on
conummication costs between the two tmits, but this comes at the cost of more expensive inputs ro
both parts of the operation (because of the negative reciprocal crowding that both activities genflr.lte in
the city).

When communication costs are high, n is very costly for :fums to spatially separate thcir headquarters

from their produ)tion plant. Consequently the demand for labour of spatially disintegrated firms is
low. As a result, a functionally specialised city will pay low \vages, captured by the bottom wage
curve itn figure 7a. In particular, this v.rage curve will be below that of a city specia.lised by sector

We assumed that fue c,ost of living was the same for both groups. This is lDll.ikcly to hold empirically since
skilled workers tend to consume more l.and because offueir higher wages. Howe\'er, v."ith land being a normal
good. a higher cost ofliving fur Silrilledl wod:ers is ~ely to of'.l:irei completely the differences in w;ages:~

M
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(medium 'l.vage curve in figure 7a). However, when commwJ.ication costs are low, lt is beneficial for
firms to spatially separate their facilities and, as a result, cities will be specialised by fimotions,

production or business services. The advantage of functional specialisation is that headquarters
(regardless of their sectors) 'IN'illbe able to exploit more fully the eronomies of scale in cities

specialised in business services and management activities. For low conmnmication costs, the wage
curve of functionally specialised ci ties is represented by the top curve in figure 7a.

Using these wage cmves, together \vith the cost of living curve represented in figure 7b, we draw, in
figure 7c, the net wage cwve for all three types of cities. It is clear that ftmctionally specialised cities

are not viable for high comnmnication costs (the net \vage curve does not intersect with the labour

supply Cl1l1le). For low communication costs, functionally specialised cl!ies are viable and the
equilibrinm size of a cityji.mclionally specialised in management and business services when
communication costs are low is larger than that of a city specialised by sector.

If \"~e accept the idea that technological progress m the last 40 years has made it easier to manage
production activities remotely (cheaper telecomnmnication, intranets, etc), we can shed some light on

the structural ttansf'OIIllation ofthe economy of cities such as London, Nevi.rYork or Paris. In the case
of London, for instance, the struc1m<lltr.rnsfonmtion that took place between the 1960s and the 1990s
c:;m be understood as

a sucoessful transition from an integrated city with a pmduction structme

·e ncompassing a range of mannfacturing sectors, :lll31lagement, government, and the handling of goods
to a fimctionally specialised city concentrated in business services, management, and high-end
government activities. In figure 7c, this corresponds to a shift from A to B . This increased
concentration ofhigh vatue~added activities with.large agglomeration economies in London may have
taken place to some extent at the expenses of many ctties from the rest ofthe country. •1\s shown by

D ur.mton and Puga (2005), if we assume (in line with empirical evidenre) that business services
benefit from stronger localisation economies than other industries, business centres will benefit from
stronger agglomeration economies l:han cities conibimng production and management and in tum the
latter will ~ oy stronger economies of scale than purely production cities. Referring back to figure 2a,

and holding COIIlll1Wlication costs oonstmt, one can think ofbusi:oess services as industry 2,
production activities as iruhJstry 1 with integrated cities as a hypothetical industiy 3 with l:be net wage
curve lying between industiy 1 and 2_This implies that cities loosing their management funotions also
have a lower optimal size. In the London case, this implies that the counterpart of the growth of
London was the poptdation decline of cities in Northern Fngland.

In a world ofped'ect mobility, this s.trnctural transformation would only imply higher wages for all

workeJ:s because a more efficient wban organisation increases productive efficiency. In tum, with
competitive land developers, the benefits of this increased efficiency will imply higher wages and a
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higher reservation le\1-cl. for workers_ However. as we v..rilJ see below, in a world of :imperfect mobility

and endogenous labour force participation, this population decline

mNorthern English cities may have

had very negative implications.

5. Pushing the framework: imperfect labour· mobility, planning r·t>gulations and labour fore.e

pal'tidpation

hnperfectlabour mobilit}' a11d margins ofadjustme.Jtf
As mentioned above, the ruagrammati.c framewrnk we introduce here allows us to be more general
tbrul previous literature. A key issue that we want to addr;ess are the implications of allowing for

imperfect labour mobility_In figures 2 to 7, we assumed flat labour supply curves, dl!le to a perfect

labom mobility assumption. We now move back to the case \Vhere mobility is imperfect, as drawn in
figure LIn this figure, the only stable equilibrium ocours in the region where net \"\'<lge shows

decreasing returns \\lith respect to city size_25 In contrast, we draw in figure Sc a steep opward sloping
supply curve (very imperfect mobility) so that it intersects the net wage CllfVe in the region of
increasing returns (ie_, for a la.'cl of population below tbe optinmm), giving a unique stable
equilibrium at point A This difference has some interesting implications_In He:ndf'Jrson (1974). the
combination of perfect labour mobility and competitive large agents (developers) imphes all areas are
at optimal population in long nm equilibrium In tbe absence ofiarge agents, perfect mobility alone
leads to overpopulated areas (see figure 2)-

Wbat we sho\\' here :is that

mtbe absence of large agents and \\lith barriers to perfect mobility, areas

can be too small in equilibrium Put differently, barriers to mobility can reduce the inefficiencies
associated with 1he absence of a market for cities_ 1bis echoes standard seoond-best results whereby
one distortion can reduce the negative effects ofanother_However, as usual, rorrecting a distortion by
introducing another distortion may come at a cost With barriers to mobility, areas may not be able to

exploit fully the extent of1h.eir increasing returns_If as suggested by the empirical literature, the ·oosts
ofbeing too large are :rather small compared to the opportunity costs ofbeing unde:r:sized (Au and
Henderson, 2004), limited labour mobility may have important hidden costs by preventing the

·exploitation of agglomeration economies_ Limited labom mobility also has implications for the way in
which tbe wban system adjusts to shocks, an issue to which vore now tum
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Consider a positive prodnctivity shock i.n the area For any given level of city size, firms can now pay
a higher wage and so the wage cmve sh:i:fts upwards. As sho\W: in figw:e 8, the new wage ,cw:ve
implies a new net wage curve (the two dashed lines) and a new equiliDriUJlll at point B. This new
equilibrinm iimphes higher wages, higher housing costs and a larger workforce. The magnitude of

these effects depends on the slope of the different curves, ie., on the three key elasticities ofthe model
(that of wages to employment, of the cost ofli.ving to population, and oflabom supply to net wages}.
What happens to the long nm equilibriwn now depends on our assumptions about the elasticity of
labour supply. We can identify three different possibilities.

Hlabour is perfectly mobile, labour supply is iinfiinitely elastic and the higher net wage attracts an
inflow ofnew workers up 1D1ti1 the point where net wages are again equalised across areas. The area
experiencing the positive productivity shock ends up with a larger population, but no change in net
wages. Put differently, a positive productivity shock \Vill be fully crowded out by an increase in the
workforce.26 The polar case of perfect immobility (i ,e., a vertical labour snpply cmve) implies the
opposite: net \¥ages increase by the full amount ofthe productivity shock, will.le the population is
lDlchangedY

When the elasticity oflabour Sl!lpply is neither zero nor infinite, the situation is more complicated and

the effect of a posifu-e productivity chmge wiD depend on the relative slope of the two rnrves: net
wage and labour supply . We can tmke three general points. First, the higher the elasticity of labour
supply, the greater the quantity (ie., population) response and the smaller the price (ie_, net wage)
adjustment. Second, in the region of increasing returns for the net wage, a positive prodcctivity shock

will be magnified and lead to an increase itn net wage that is larger than the original productivity
shock In contrast, in the region of decreasing returns, the effect ofthe shock on net wage will be
stmller than the itnitial shock Third, the elasticity of net wages in tum depends on the elasticity of
wages (positively) and the elasticity of the cost of living (negatively).

Ibe analysis of other location-spec-ific shocks follows <lirectly from this. For instance a cheaper c.ost of
living has the same effect on the net wage cmve as a positive productivity shock. As shown in the
Appendix, this analysis gener.ilises to the case of a small discrete nnmher of <lfeas.

The analysis of common shocks is slightly more mvol\.-ed because a. productivity shock in the
economy affects not only the wage ,c urve of an area but also its labour supply curve_Following a
common positive prodootivity shock, the wage curve (which represents labour demand) shifts upwards
26
This: result depends on the assumption that there are a large niiDlber of cities.. The case v.'ith a small number of
cities is more complicated and is discussed in the Appendix..
27
Clearly, the assumption that cost ofliving does not depend on wages in the city is cmcial when reaching this:
conclusion.. See om earlier ,d lscussj cm_
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as in the case •ex.amined above, but now the labour supply curve also shifts upwards. The final effect

depends on how the two curves shift relative to each other_Ifthe shifts ofthe two curves are perl'ectly
symmetric (ie._, the shock has similar effects everywhere), the shift ofthe wage curve will be ·exactly

offset by that of the labour supply C!llfVe so that the new equilibrium will occur for a higher net wage
but with the same population_ Ifthe effects ofthe shock are not exactly the same everywhere:, the area

tmy gain or lose population_ These gam and losses will be larger when labour supply is more ehsfic_
To see this more precisely, consider a common positive productivity shock leading to a proportional
W.ccease in productivity_ This implies an anti-clockwise rotation of the wage curve armmd its origin in
our figure. In tum, the net wage curve shifts upwards implying an increase in the optimal population

size_Ifthe labour supply curve also shifts upwards following this co1l11llon productivity shock, \\:'e

tmy obtain t\v o (interior) equili"bria rather than one (with.the new equilibriwn being unstable} Since
not all areas can grow at the same time (we need to keep population constant), this implies that some
areas \Vill lose population_ Assuming that the upward sloping labour supply curve reflects differences
W. the willingness to migrate then the least mobile workers will be stuck in lmdet:sized areas. Put

differe:olly, a positive roiDDIDD. productivity shock may be bad news for some areas_28 Such results
·echo that ofDmanton and Puga! (2005) outlined above which relies on a decline in comnnmication

costs between cities_ The general conchlsion we draw here is that tedmological progress, ·even though
i.t maybe "'smooth., from a macroeconomic perspective, is likely to disrupt the urban :system and imply
a smaller optimal number of cities. Imperfect labour mobility clearly prevents this type of adjustment

and can lead to large wclfue losses. This type ofproblem may be mitigated by population growth
(which implies a larger munber of cities). However in c:ouotries with stagnant or decreasing
29

populations, these issues are likely to berome more a.oute in the future_

We c.an fina11y tum to the effects of W.tegrafu'e shocks_For such shocks, the NEG fulme\1;rork is
probably more appropriate for thinking through the consequences_These extensions have been

proposed by Tabucru.and Thisse (2002) and Murata (200.3). To model J.inrited labour mobility, they
use a standard discrete choice framework with heterogeneous workers: all workers are potentialJy
mobile but the costs of moving are idiosyncratic_ This case can be treated grnphically in an identical
mmner to the amlysis in the Appendix. The main result of Tabuchi. and Thisse (2002) and :Muratl
(2003) is that, with limited labour mobility, lower transport costs de not lead to unstable equilibria and
catastrophic agglomeration reversing the result ofKrugman ( 1991) that we worked through above.

The reason behind this result is that imperfect labom mobility provides an extra <tispersion force: An
up\1owd s lopitog labour supply curve, which gets vertical as the whole population concentrates in one

21

Of course the same type of resullt would be obtained U: instead of a common positive productivity :iliock:, we
would consider an improvement in commuting technology leading toll shift of the cost ofliving curve..
29
Again r.Using the issue of how to deaJ with fue decline of s.ome cities. See the end o f Slection 4 .
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area, implies that the labour supply cunre always cross the net vorage curve from below regan:D.ess of
the shape of the latter (provided degenerate cases such as a vertical net wage curve are avoided)_
Hence the eqnilibrim:n is always interior and stable.

Plmmiug .regulatiQlts
Another issue that we can address using our di.aglammatic fuunework: is that of the impaot ofpl:amting
regul<l!tions_To keep the amlysis short and simple, let us examine the effects of a strict growth control

policy, which forbids any further land development in a location after it hits some upper size boood_ In
effect, this implies an upper bound for size ofthe local population. Figure 9a presents a standard
upwMd-sloping wage au:ve_The solid cwve in figure 9b represents the cost of living under growth
control while the dashed curve repr;esents the cost of living in the absence of growth control Using

these two Cl:ll\>-es, in figure 9c., we obtain the net wage rurve under growth control and the net wage
au:ve without growth control (solid and dashed line respectively)_The last curve represented in figure
9c is the labour Sl!lpply curve_It is simple to read off that the equihlnium. with grollirfh control is at A
while the equihDrium without grov.1h control is at B_

The fust important result regMds the effects of growth control on whether cities are tmder or
oversized_Just like barrie£s to mobility, gmv.rfh control measures have an ambiguous efficiency effect
in a second-best world. 1be reason is that in the absence of a mrohanism, like large agents, to
ffilplemeot the efficient population size of an area, the area may be over-populated in equihOrium.._ In
contTast, growth controls typically imply under-population. HoV<·e ver, as highlighted before it is

always dangerous to offset one distortion by introducing another distortion Indeed, in figure 9c the net
wage under growth control is actually smaller than the net wage if the c.ity was oversized (compare the
net wage :at A to the net wage at B).

In case ofa positive locat ion specific shock when growth.control is binding, note that the sole margin
of adjustment is the cost of living_ This is beause a positive productivity shock raises wages~ In twn

this makes the area DlOfe attractive_1ben, potential in-migrants bid up the price of housing_ However,
because of growth control, the population cannot increase. Hence the adjustment is such that the net
wage must remain constant_This implies that the increase in housing costs completely offSets the
increase

mwages. Supportive evidence ofthis type ofeffect is given in Glaeser et al_(2005}.

L-abonr force participation
We now enrich our framework to consider yet another margin of adjustment: participation in the
labour market This margin is usually neglected in the theoretical literature, although empirically it
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appears to play a lll.ajor role. According to Decressin and Fatas (1995), in the European Union, when a
regi.on experience; a negative employment shock, 78% of the adjustment ooalfS through labour force
participation in the fust year and 500/o through participation in the second year (the remaining
adjos.tment ocrnrring tbrough uoemployment and out-migration). Figure lOa, shows how the standard
wage curve moves when the location experiences a negative productivity shock (from the solid to the
dashed line). Figure lOb is a standard cost of living curve. As 11SI'lal, the difference between the wage

and the cost of living leads to the net wage rurve in figure 1Oc. The solid bell-shaped curve is the net
wage before the shock and the dashed bell-shaped rurve represents. the net wage after the shock.

The main difference with the previous figures concerns the labour supply curve. 1be upward sloping

straight line is a standard labour supply curve. With constant labour force participation, the effect of a
negative productivity (or demand) shock is strai.gbtfOIWard Some worlrers leave the area after the
shock and the local economy adjusts. to a lower wage and a lower local population. On the figure, the
equili.brinm \lo'Ould shift from point A to B.

To model the participation decision, we assume that below a certain net wage threshold, wotkers drop
out oftbe labour fooce and rely on the welfare system instead.30 Consider again the same negative
productivity shock, this time taking the participation constr<l!int illlto account After the :shock the
unronstramed equilibrimn (point B) is not feasible becal!lSe before reaching poilllt B, at poilllt D, the
local economy ruts the reservation net wage. Labour foroe participation then drops until ta:bour supply
crosses the net wage at point C. The gap between D and C on the X-axi.s is the extent ofnonparticipation in the labour force. In this case, the adjustment to a negative shock implies not only
lov;rer Vo~'<lges and out-migration but also workers dropping om of the labour force and becoming
unemployed or claiming alternatives fOimS ofbenefits. such as disability benefits, etc.

Note that the consequences of a negative shock could be much worse than in the case just discussed. If
for instance, the maximum ofthe dashed net "\\rage rutve (the net wage CllllVe after the shock) were to
go below the reservation level ofworkers, participation would then drop to zero.31

30

Whether the participation decision is driven by the level ofnominal wage or instead by the net wage i.s an
empiric-al question. In countries where unemployed workers are likely to receive housing subsidies as welll as
unemployment benefits in cash like the UK, it is utm:al to assume that participation is driven by net wages.
31
When the la.b om supply curve intersec~s the ne-~ ~onge curve in the region ofincreasing returns, some dnmatic
c.on.seqnences are also possible. In part;icul.n, rt may again be the case fuat, after a shock, the labour supply cm:ve
no longer has any intersection w ith the net ~onge cmve. This would again lead the l.abour force participation to
drop to zero. This case is partioularly inefficient because a less steep labom supply line (i.e.., more labour
mobility) can imply another equilibrium with full labour fOrce p:uticipation.
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6. Conclusions

This paper develops a diagr.m:umti.c framework to analyse the spatial economy and how lt adjusts to

shocks_1bis fr.unev.'Oik allows a clear comparison betv."eeel the core models of the Ulban systems
approa-ch and NEG. Existing extensions ofthese models can also be studied within the same

framework Beyond this our diagrammatic framewodr. leods tt:self well to a number ofpolicy-oriented
·e xtensions_In particular, we consider the implications of impelfect labour mobility, local (land) supply
regul<l!tions, and labour force participation decisions, issues that are seldom. studied in the existing
literature_ Fw1her policy extensions to be dealt with in future work regard other spatial policies such as
regional subsidies, the tmcati.on of agglomeration rents, etc (see BaJdwin et aL, 2003, for an cmalytic

t:reatment in an NEG framewmk)From a theoretical perspective, a weakness ofour approach is t.oo.t we still look at urban systems and
NEG models separately whereas one of om conclusions is that these two approaches should be looked
at together: NEG is preoccupied volith broad spatial trends whereas the tuban system hteratur:e is
concerned with spikes in the economic Jaodscape_The tvm are nmtually dependent but a full analysis
of their j oint implications must waiil: for another tilme.

Our results lDlderscore the :importance of three key relations_ The importance of the relation between
local employment and local wages has been aoknowledged for a long time and much is known about it
both theoretically and empmcaJly. The issues surrounding the rost of living are well understood
theoretically but empirically estimating the cost of living CUIVe has proved elusive_Fmatly, we also
showed that tbe local labour supply was a fhndamental determinant of the way in v;fti-ch areas adjust to

shocks. Much still needs to be learnt about local labour supply , both theoretically and empirically. We
hope future wod: will address these issues.
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Appe11di:.t.:: Int.e.raclions amo.n g a smallmmtber ofareas m 1der imperfect labour mobilit) '

It is possible to generalise the analysis of shocks under imperfect mobility to aacount for the possible
interactions among a small number of areas_ This extens:ion i.s partirularly relevant when migration
flows are mostly short distance. The concave upward sloping curve in figure Al represents the net
wage for area L It can be derived mexactly the same fuhion as before from a wage cmve and a cost
of living curve. which we omit for simplicity_'The second important curve .in the figure is the net wage
C111Ve for area.2 (a thinner curve that mirrors the net 1.vage curve for area ])_Assuming that the total
population of the two areas is constantc, this net wage curve shows directly the wage in area 2 for any
level of population marea l_ Under perfect mobility, the equ.ihbrium would imply the equalisation of
net wages in the two areas at point A (wruch incidentally would be l!mS!able since the intersection is in

the regi.on of increasing returns} With imperfect labour mobility, the Sl!lpply of labour in area 1 is

represented by the convex upward sloping curve in the figure_ It intersects the net wage curve of area 1
at point A' _Note that trus equilibrium implies a larger population in area l _A possible reason behind
this could be the following_ In the region of increasing returns, there are forces pushing towards the

concentration oftbe entire population in one area_ However, wotkers may have personal preferences
for one or the other area These locational preferences imply a convex labour supply ourve as in the
figure and the workers staying in area 2 are those with strong preferences for this area_

Consider now a positive productivity shock in area l Thi.s productivity shock implies an upward shift
of the net wage cmve in the figure (the concave dashed curve)_Ifthe labour supply rnrve was
determined only by the net wage in area 1, the new equihbriwn would be found at point B_ However,

d is more reasonable to expect migration to be driven by the differential in net ·wages tather than the
net wage at destination only_ Consequently, we expect the productivity shock to shift the labour supply
curve as well, although this shift will be downwards not upwards, which gives the dashed convex.
curve. This is because for any level ofpopulation in area 1, the difference in wages between the two
areas i.s rugher after the shock
The shift of the net wage curve of area 1 between A' and C now implies that the post~shock gap in net
wages for the pre--shock population levels is represented by the segrrent C - C' (instead ofC- A'
before the shock)_ With C' - D' running paraHel to C - D, the new gap in net wages can be
represented by D - D' _Such a difference in net wages would have implied an equilibrium in D' before
the shock Put differently, aside from a shift in the net v.rage Cii.1!Ve, the shock also implies a labour
supply curve shift from A, to D' _The new equilibrium after the shock is then represented by pointE
To su.mrnruise, a positive productivity shock in an area has two effects_There is a direct effect making
the area more attractive in absolute terms_ With a large nmnber of areas (and no area being able to
affect the national equilibrium), the adjustment would stop here. However, with a small number of

areas, for any level ofpopulation an increase in the attractiverrss of an area implies a larger difference
in net wages bet\\"een the two areas and thus a shift in the labour supply curve, which adds t.o the first
.effect_
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